Berkowitz/Escobar

🎬Battle on the Krupskaya Bulge

Berkowitz/Escobar

February 4th, 2024

💒Briefly, the so called Panama Papers case was a leakage of the Mossack Fonseca's firm (MSF) archive, which was disclosed and published, regardless of this action is a criminal offense: the commercial secrets, confidentiality, non-disclosure are the cornerstones of the US law with regards to any business, however, for this case the norms of criminal law were compromised. For many years, the MSF has been conducting operations related to incorporation, liquidation, accounting, trust management, and other related services. Criminals who illegally obtained confidential information and disclosed it claimed that this publication had resulted in the public disclosure of the names of politicians and public figures who were involved in an activity that could be considered as a 'conflict of interest.' Despite the Panama Papers data being illegally obtained and insufficient to draw conclusions or interpretations, many individuals from different countries were included on the list. Nevertheless, there were a lot of shameful publications that were propagandistic on the ICIJ website. The list excludes American politics, which is a remarkable fact. The rough conclusion is as follows. The German newspaper and website, which are funded by many US and doubtful organizations that do not reveal even their office locations, have published the stolen data. The data provided a general overview of the legal structures of various companies, and it was supplemented with conclusions based on unknown sources of information.

This context, presented together with the publications of stolen data, affected the reputation of many people and the industry of foreign jurisdiction services. Quick review of the published information demonstrated that in the documents were mentioned the legal entities apparently included into the legal structure of the Los Zetas drug cartel, considering the prefix ZZZ and the very specific style of names' giving, when every company got it specifically for every new project or transaction to launder money and inject them into the official economics turnover. Among the companies with the prefix ZZZ (Los Zetas), were listed their affiliates and related parties Alfa Group, and its subsidiary A1. Alfa Bank received the money from drug cartels via the chain of fictitious firms, and then used it to imitate crediting in affiliated retail companies. The money was returned to Alfa Bank and its satellites, such as Home Credit, Russian Standard, MKB, and others, in a clean and fresh condition after the completion of fictitious transaction 'credit payment.' As long as the amount of money to be laundered was undefined and depended on the separate transactions, both, the bank and the retail Laundromats, had the prepared blanket forms for crediting with an empty space left for the sum, which filled out based on the amount of each transaction. Participation in this 'crediting' was extended to other Alfa group banks and its retail Laundromats. The 'black cash office' was used by Alfa Bank and its satellites to credit the money of the drug cartels. Booking the deals on balance was done just in case of NPL. Despite the norms of federal law, Central Bank, Bazel's, and COSO requirements, none of the banks in the 'bank ring' issued properly documented credits and performed standard banking documentation and accounting procedures. Non-standard banking documentation was used to support the cases of illegal prosecution against Oleg Yakovlev and Sergey Bobylev. In reality, there were no credits taken, and the retail operation was owned by the same legal entities. Considering this, it can be concluded that no money was stolen from Alfa Bank as they did not leave the Alfa Bank legal group. MKB was an example of the one of the banks in the bank ring that were directly guided by US public officials on the Board. The forms of soft controls via credits, bonds, interbanking operations were also applied. Mass adoption has become fashionable because the distributed and complicated asset structure requires many trusting managers. Just Roman Avdeev brings up about 30 orphans fed by him for the future work to look after the property.

The Los Zetas and the Medellin, Sinaloa, CJNG, and Cali cartels came together to form one corporation that focuses on drug production and sale, smuggling, money laundering, terrorism, and serial murders. Panama's location has been widely known as their major hub for drug trafficking and money laundering for decades. The Panama Paper's list's failure to include US public authorities and individuals is a significant error in this context. Cocaine was trans-shipped to the United States as part of the illegal drug trade in Panama. The 1989 United States invasion of Panama to topple Dictator Manuel Noriega was justified in part by the need to combat drug trafficking. Nonetheless, the outcome was in the opposite direction. Noriega, the dictator of Panama from 1983 to 1989, had a relationship with the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from the 1950s. Thus, all operations in Panama, were under the control of the CIA. Discovering the series of trading faces activities is easy when describing the CIA's activities in Panama through the remarkable ZR/RIFLE programs. No problem to identify the new image of the serial murderer David Berkowitz, whose mistakes in the appearance amendments, alongside with no changes in the behavior, allowed to match his personality with the new passport of the ZR/RIFLE mercenary issued in the name of Pablo Escobar, founder of the Medellin Cartel. Another one was El Chapo, the CEO of the Sinaloa cartel, who was taken back to the US by the imitating of El Chapo capture and extradition.

According to the 1988 Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, Panama's General Manuel Antonio Noriega's story was considered one of the worst foreign policy miscues in the United States: "The failure of the US officials to act was largely the result of the relationships Panamisn official had developed with US intelligence and law enforcement agencies in performing services for them on a variety of matters, including drug enforcement." During the 1970s and 1980s, Noriega excelled at manipulating the US policy against his country, resulting in near-absolute power in Panama. It's clear that every US government agency that had a connection with Noriega ignored his corruption and drug dealing. Noriega was developing into a significant figure for the Medellin Cartel, which included the notorious Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar created by the CIA's ZR/RIFLE program by the reincarnated David Berkowitz. Noriega was allowed to establish "the hemisphere's first 'narcokleptocracy.' The important component of the narcokleptocracy was the maintenance of the complicated legal structures dedicated for the drug trafficking and money laundering. Another element of the narcokleptocracy established by the CIA through the chain of its mercenaries, became drug wars with their inherent element - enormous atrocity and ritual serial mass murders. Thus, for Berkowitz this job was probably the one of the most intimate dreams: to legally commit murder, for which he was sentenced to 365 years in prison in the United States. Now we know what it means in the US justice system: to become a CIA mercenary and get official permission to commit serial murders in their interests without hindrance and with impunity.

Written by Meggi Göring. All rights reserved. 2024. Copyright by the BOOST.

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